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THE PUBLIC DIMENSION OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE:
IMPACT ON THE MEDIA, THE CITIZENRY, AND
GOVERNMENTS - A U.S. PERSPECTIVE*
Christopher T. Hill*
I want to talk about the relationship of technology to society and about
how society uses government to try to influence technology in both positive
and negative ways. My background for this presentation includes my training
as an engineer combined with twenty-eight years of involvement in the tech-
nology and science policy-making apparatus, both as an academic and as a
government official. I have had titles for the last fifteen years with the words
"technology policy" in them. Twenty years ago, no one would have had a job
title containing the words "technology policy." It was not a category that we
really recognized. We saw technology policy as emerging out of science
policy, economic policy, and national security policy, all of which had con-
cerns with technology. But now technology policy has become important
enough that there are U.S. congressional committees with "technology pol-
icy" in their names. Why is this? I think it is because the invention, develop-
ment, use, and application of technology is extremely important in our soci-
ety.
In some sense, technology is the quintessential human activity. Human-
ity's ability to craft tools is an important aspect of what distinguishes us from
the cows, pigs, cockroaches, and the rest. We are able to think, abstract, and
use tools to shape our environment. When we talk about technology in the
broadest sense, that is what we are talking about. In more practical terms,
technology is the products, processes, devices, systems, and networks that we
use to help us individually and collectively pursue our goals and our dreams.
Society enjoys many benefits from new technology and its applications.
We develop new technology because it enables us to do things we could not
do before, such as engaging in discussion with each other in real time at long
distance. Before about 1850, that could only be done by means of mirrors,
flashing lights, or waving flags. We do not do semaphore anymore - instead
we do HTML and Java. We also develop new technology because it enables
* An earlier version of the Article, Technology Policy and the Internet World, appeared
in 48 VA. LAW. 64-67 (1999).
** Dr. Hill is Vice Provost for Research and Professor of Public Policy and Technology at
George Mason University. He holds a B.S. degree from the Illinois Institute of Technology,
and M.S. and Ph.D. degrees from the University of Wisconsin, all in chemical engineering.
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us to do things we could already do, but at a lower cost, with higher quality,
or with higher productivity. For example, we use much less energy now than
we might have used a century ago to move things around, to produce things,
to heat our food, or to make steel. We get much greater crop yields from an
acre of land than we did in the old days.
In the aggregate, we know improvements in technology are important to
our society and our economies. It has been estimated by economists, using a
variety of methods, that fifty to seventy percent of economic growth in the
industrialized economies in the twentieth century derives from the use of new
technologies. Technology is central to our national security posture. It made
it possible for us to conduct the recent Kosovo operation as we did.
As a society, we use public policy to enhance the benefits that may flow
from new technology. For example, we subsidize research and development
directed at new and better technology; we invest in the education and training
of technical experts; we develop systems of standards to facilitate commerce
in new technologies; and we seek to remove barriers to the use of new tech-
nology. These kinds of actions are the focus of what I call "developmental"
technology policy. At the same time, society also uses public policy to con-
trol the consequences of the use of new technology. For, even as technology
enables us to do things better, it poses new challenges of scale, scope, and
impact to societies. For example, because it is now so easy and inexpensive
to drive large cars, live in large homes, and consume energy for all sorts of
purposes, our per capita consumption of energy is much higher than it was in
earlier times, even though each particular use of energy is a lot more efficient
than it might have been a century ago. I call society's efforts to restrain and
guide the use of new technology or to control its side effects "managerial"
technology policy. Because technology is such a powerful force in society, it
tends to drive demands for its public management. Let me illustrate.
Public health and medical technologies have enabled many more of us to
survive our childhood and live to old age. This has resulted in an explosive
growth in human population during the past century and has brought a host
of new demands on the natural environment that sustains us here on Earth, as
well as more prosaic things like the ever-growing costs of health care for the
elderly. Many of the most important consequences for society of the devel-
opment and use of new technologies are not foreseen by anyone at the time
financial investments and other social commitments are made to use the
technology to solve problems or improve productivity. Furthermore, many of
the costs of technological applications are not borne by those who promote
and benefit from their use. This leads to divisions in society between those
who enjoy the benefits of new technology and those who bear its cost.
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But more important than the consequences of the use of new technology
and its direct costs and benefits, and more important than its distributional
impacts on different groups, are the effects of new technology on core human
values and norms of society. When new technology makes it possible to
solve a problem that we used to think resulted from the working of God's
will, it can upset long-established values. For example, early improvements
in public health and medicine a century ago greatly enhanced the probability
that a newborn child could survive into adulthood. I believe this had a lot to
do with how we view children. It engendered the child labor statutes, and it
caused us to be in a position where, as a society, we now will go to almost
any length to save the life and health of a child. We might not have done that
a century ago because we would not have attached ourselves to a child whose
life was ephemeral. Today, we expect all children to survive, and we attach
great value to their survival from the beginning. I believe that this new rever-
ence for children's survival drives the abortion debate as well.
Closer to home, the widespread availability of the highly diverse, and
sometimes objectionable, content on the Internet threatens a host of tradi-
tional values and attitudes held by many different groups in society who
would like to bring Internet content under control.
In analyzing the place of values in society, philosophers distinguish be-
tween utilitarian perspectives, in which the right thing to do is determined by
costs and benefits, and a more fundamental perspective, in which there are
things that are not legitimately traded in the marketplace and not legitimately
attached to monetary costs and benefits, like human life. In America, you
cannot sell your kidney. It is not a question of the price, it is a question of
fundamental values. Yet new technology can, over time, cause major shifts in
our attachment to fundamental values. Once new medical technology creates
a stronger probability that you can survive organ donation without severe
complications, I expect it will become perfectly fine to sell organs.
I expect that privacy, about which there is so much debate today in
connection with electronic communication and the Internet, will slowly fade
away as a value. We all can know more and more about each other. And the
value to us of the technological system that enables that to happen will tran-
scend our concern for our privacy. I expect that, in fifty years, folks in a
room like this will think it quaint that we in 1999 worried so much about
privacy.
Here are some of the things that the federal government does to encour-
age new technology using a wide variety of public policies. For instance, we
give tax preferences for technology development - businesses can deduct the
3
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expenses of research and development in the year they are incurred.' In addi-
tion, we offer a tax credit for incremental expenditures on research and ex-
perimentation above the average of the prior three years.
We offer direct financial subsidies, like the Small Business Innovation
Research Program (SBIR), which is a program run by eleven or twelve fed-
eral agencies. It spends almost two billion dollars a year of federal money in
providini what amounts to seed capital to small firms to develop new tech-
nologies. SBIR is much bigger than some of the highly controversial and
politicized programs, such as the Advanced Technology Program in the De-
4partment of Commerce. We provide services to industry through govern-
ment, such as the Manufacturing Extension Partnership Program, which has
more than 200 centers around the United States that provide technical and
business assistance to small and medium-sized firms.5
A number of policies affect the rules of the game under which new tech-
nologies are developed. Prominent among these is the National Cooperative
Research Act of 1984, which provides a safe haven in the antitrust laws for
firms that wish to do research and development together - if they were will-
ing to register with the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commis-
6
sion.
The Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986 changed the rules under
which companies and government laboratories can collaborate. Companies
can use the technology developed in the laboratory for private commercial
I See I.R.C. § 174 (b)(1)(C) (1994).
2 See I.R.C. § 41(h) (1995).
3 The Small Business Innovation Research Program is a product of the Small Business
Innovation Development Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-219, 96 Stat. 217 (1982). "The objec-
tives of the Program are to: 1) stimulate technological innovation; 2) use small business to
meet federal R&D needs; 3) encourage the participation by disadvantaged and minority per-
sons in technological innovation; and 4) increase private sector commercialization derived
from federal R&D. Ohio Department of Development, What is the SBIR Program?,
<http://www.odod.ohio.gov/tech/sbir/tisbira.htm> (visited June 24, 1999).
The Advanced Technology Program is administered by the U.S. Department of Com-
merce's National Institute of Standards and Technology. Its objective is to create "a unique
partnership between government and private industry to accelerate the development of high-
risk technologies that promise significant commercial payoffs and widespread benefits for the
economy." National Institute of Standards and Technology, About the ATP, <http://www.atp.
nist.gov/atp/overview.htm> (visited June 24, 1999). See Christopher T. Hill, The Advanced
Technology Program: Opportunities for Enhancement, in INVESTING IN INNOVATION:
CREATING A RESEARCH AND INNOVATION POLICY THAT WORKS (L. M. Branscomb & J. H.
Keller, eds., MIT Press, 1998).
5 For more details on the Manufacturing Extension Partnership Program, see the Pro-
gram's Web site at <http://www.mep.nist.gov/ndex.html> (visited Aug. 11, 1999).
6 See National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-462, 99 Stat. 1815
(1984).
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purposes. The Act provides assurance to the companies involved that their
own intellectual property will be protected during that kind of an arrange-
ment.7
Much of the justification for public funding of research and development,
for university education, and for government labs stems from the expectation
that the new knowledge generated will find its way into practical application
to meet economic, national security, environmental, and other national ob-
jectives. These are only a few of the things we do.
How much technology policy of this kind is enough? How do we know
what to do? Economists analyze what is appropriate for government to do
based on the theory of market failure, which argues that free markets left to
themselves under-invest in new knowledge and new technologies, owing to
spillover benefits for those who do not pay and to inadequately developed
intellectual property rights, even with the patent system. While this theory
creates a rationale for government investment in new technology, it can also
be turned around to create arguments that limit the extent of government
investment. It has been my experience in Washington, that those arguments
are most persuasive in academic seminars and think tank meetings, but they
are never terribly important to congressional and presidential consideration
of policy. Instead, technology policy is more practically focused on trying to
get things done that political leaders and their constituencies view as impor-
tant. For example, the United States invested 100 million dollars a year for
seven years in SEMATECH to help strengthen the U.S. semiconductor in-
dustry. Many would say that investment could not pass an economic test, but
it certainly passed the political test with flying colors.
Soon after Bill Clinton took office in 1993, technology policy for the first
time became an active tool in political debates. In 1993, the new President
endorsed a number of previously low-profile technology policy programs,
thus making them high-profile. When they became high-profile, Newt
Gingrich, then the Speaker of the House, and a strong supporter of science
and technology, attacked them, and there was a big fight over technology
programs. That had never happened before to technology policy, and most of
us who worked in it did not know how to deal with politics intruding into our
little neighborhood.
In policy-making terms, I would argue that what drives public policy to-
ward technology is the leaders of the scientific and technical communities in
academia, industry, and government laboratories can make compelling ar-
guments for why a nation simply must invest in fiber-optics, cancer research,
space, high-energy physics, and so on. Those arguments almost always take
7 See Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-502, 100 Stat. 1785
(1986).
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place independent of any consideration of economic benefits and costs, at
least as economists would understand them.
Federal incentives for technology development are widely supported po-
litically when they address a clearly identified public mission, like national
security, space investigation, or solving health and environmental problems.
But the public and political leaders are less supportive of such programs
when they are simply intended to help the marketplace work better. We have
not come to a societal consensus that there is a legitimate government role in
developing new technology when the end point is a private good. We are
very ambivalent about this. At the same time, there can be a lot of support
when a technology offers to meet public and private missions simultane-
ously. A wonderful example is the Internet.
The Internet was developed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA) and the National Science Foundation (NSF). DARPA
supported it early as a method for ensuring communication among military
installations around the world in the event of substantial disruption of com-
munication networks. NSF took over when the objective shifted to support-
ing access to high-speed digital communication for academic research and
education. When the Internet became a commercial enterprise around 1995,
it was a very controversial action. The "dot com"s came a long time after the
"dot edu"s as legitimate users of the Internet. But, suddenly we have discov-
ered that incredible things can come out of a mixed motivation for govern-
ment involvement in the support of new technology.
Let me turn to managerial technology policy. We have a whole set of
federal policies to manage and mitigate the undesirable consequences of new
technology. I would identify three broad policy domains: 1) programs to
gather and analyze information about the effects of new technology; 2) pro-
grams to manage and mitigate those effects; and 3) efforts to block the use of
new technologies altogether.
Let me turn first to the blocking efforts. There are efforts from time to
time to block the use of a new technology because somebody does not like
what it does. For example, we have prohibited research on therapeutic uses
•. 8
of marijuana. We have forbidden the use of government funds to support
research on fetal tissue for the improvement of the human nervous system.9
8 Rep. Barney Frank (I-VT) has proposed legislation in each of the past three Congresses
to legalize the medical use of marijuana, but each bill has died in committee. See H.R. 2618,
104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 1782, 10 51h Cong. (1997); H.R. 912, 10 6th Cong. (1999).
9 On January 22, 1993, President Clinton rescinded the ban on the use of government
funds for fetal tissue research, but there remain several restrictions throughout U.S. law. See
Jennifer Couzin, The Promise and Peril of Stem Cell Research, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
May 31, 1999, at 68; see also generally Cory Zion, Comment, The Legal and Ethical Issues of
Fetal Tissue Research and Transplantation, 75 OR. L. REv. 1281 (1996).
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Some years ago, objections were raised in California when the state was us-
ing state money to support research to improve tomato harvesters, because it
threatened to put a lot of people who picked tomatoes out of work. There
have also been proposals to ban the use of metal cans for beer and soft
drinks. The chemical industry got really shaken quite deeply a few years ago
when serious proposals were made by environmental groups to ban the use of
chlorine-containing chemicals of all kinds.
Let me turn to the gathering and analysis of information. In 1972, Con-
gress passed the Technology Assessment Act that created the Office of
Technology Assessment (OTA) to do studies of the effects of new technol-
ogy on society. The OTA existed for more than twenty years and was
closed in early 1995.1 During that time it did more than 700 studies. You can
buy all the OTA studies on CDs for about twenty-four dollars. Its demise in
1995, which was politically driven, came just as the need for a relatively ob-
jective source of data collection and analysis about the Internet became a top
priority for the country. I believe the OTA would have been the host for im-
portant national debates about Internet taxation, content controls, privacy,
security, international harmonization, domain name assignments, new tech-
nology investments, access rules, and so on.
To manage the effects of new technology, we usually turn to regulation.
We sometimes use tax incentives to encourage the use of new technology in
more acceptable ways, but usually we fall back on some form of direct regu-
lation. The explosive growth of federal government regulation during the
Progressive era, during the New Deal, and during the 1960s and 1970s was a
direct consequence of the desire of society to manage the effects of new
waves of technology. These effects included the monopoly power that flowed
from the technology-facilitated growth of large corporations in the last part
of the nineteenth century, leading to the Progressive era. Similarly, the im-
balance of power between employers and employees in mass production en-
terprises led to a lot of the New Deal social regulation. The environmental
risks and other risks that arose from the widespread use of advanced tech-
nologies in the mid-twentieth century led to the air pollution, water pollution,
products safety, and other regulations of that period. In each case, public
policies were adopted with the intent of causing the beneficiaries of new
technologies to change their behaviors and/or redesign their technologies to
10 See Technology Assessment Act, Pub. L. No. 92-484, 86 Stat. 797 (codified as
amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 471-81 (1994); Larry Witham, Scientists Lament Federal Budget
Cuts, WASH. TIMEs, Dec. 30, 1995, at A4.
1 See Legislative Branch Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-53, §§ 112-14,
109 Stat. 514,526 (1995).
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reduce or eliminate the harmful effects they would have on consumers in
society.
American society believes strongly in the efficacy of research and tech-
nology development to solve our problems. So, when we regulate technology
we turn to that same optimism. The policy process is firmly convinced that
industry, if given the right set of incentives or constraints, can always find a
way to meet a demand that society imposes on it. So, the policy process is
quite comfortable with technology forcing regulations precisely because in-
dustry has shown itself over and over again to be able to meet new markets
and new demands. New public policy is just another change in the market in
which firms operate.
I would like to close with a couple of comments on technology policy for
the Internet world. Despite its relative youth, the Internet has already demon-
strated enormous capability to influence our lives for the better. We have
only scratched the surface of its potential benefits in education, health care,
government, politics, the economy, entertainment, cultural enrichment,
communications, and so on. We recognize that the underlying technologies
still offer potential orders of magnitude of further improvement in quality, in
speed, in complexity, and in service. The future seems almost limitless, and
things move more rapidly every day.
At the same time, it has become clear, often embarrassingly so, that the
Internet also offers unlimited possibilities to do mischief and to challenge
hallowed values. Since anyone with a personal computer and a modem can
publish for the whole world, the Internet opens us to a barrage of communi-
cation, some pornographic, violent, or subversive, and otherwise disturbing.
Many of these messages are unsuitable for the millions of children who
"surf' the Internet every day, and who do it a lot more effectively than most
adults. Our growing dependence on the Internet as a medium for communi-
cation and commerce has already made us deeply vulnerable to those who
would disrupt or corrupt its operations, whether for fun, out of spite, for per-
sonal gain, or to serve the interest of foreign powers.
To a considerable extent, there is very little qualitatively new about the
technology policies we need to develop the Internet or to manage it. Existing
concepts of the role of government vis-4-vis the market, of the constitutional
separation of powers among the branches and levels of government, and
about the appropriateness of cost-benefit balancing for most public policy
issues seem sufficient. Similarly, the constitutional concepts of free speech,
privacy, and private property, including intellectual property, are sufficient as
a framework within which to address the Internet's undesirable effects.
On the other hand, the quantitative scope and scale of the problems cre-
ated by the Internet make me wonder whether current institutions are up to
8
Canada-United States Law Journal, Vol. 25 [1999], Iss. , Art. 25
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol25/iss/25
Hill-THE PUBLIC DIMENSION OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (U.S.)
the task. The scale and scope of its reach into every home, institution, and
business has created a plethora of very specific and difficult issues to be ad-
dressed. Current laws, regulatory frameworks, and government institutional
structures may need to be revised or augmented. For example, states have
struggled for years to collect taxes from those who mail order from out-of-
state, thereby avoiding local taxation. It has not really mattered much be-
cause mail order has not been all that important to states' economies. But
Internet commerce threatens to take a very substantial proportion of retail
sales out of the hands of local merchants, where they can be taxed, and put
them into the hands of distant mail order houses, where they cannot effec-
tively be taxed as of yet. It is no wonder that the states want to find new ways
to tax the Internet. The Congress has established a national commission to
take a look at what to do about Internet taxation.12 Old solutions are not go-
ing to work. We are going to need some new approaches altogether if states
are going to continue to be able to raise money to operate. The cyber-
libertarians would say this is wonderful, and that we have finally found a
way to cut the states off altogether. I doubt that is a likely outcome.
As I noted earlier, we need an institution where we can have a national
debate about Internet policy. We need a forum in which to study, analyze,
and encourage constructive engagement among the diverse protagonists and
arrive at a consensus about wise courses of action regarding Internet policies.
I am happy to report that a group of academic, business, and other leaders in
the northern Virginia and greater Washington region are now working to
build such an organization. We are hoping that we can develop a situation in
northern Virginia where we not only manage fifty percent of the world's
Internet traffic, but where we also play a major role in defining public policy
toward the Internet for the twenty-first century.
12 The Advisory Commission on Electronic Commerce was created in October 1998 by
the Internet Tax Freedom Act. See Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Ap-
propriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, Title XI, 112 Stat. 2681-719.
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